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Photographic 

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«• 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes/Notes  techniques  et  bibliographiques 


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D 
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Cover  title  missing/ 

Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 


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mais,  lorsque  ceia  Atait  pobsibla.  ces  pages  n'ont 
pas  At6  filmAes. 

Additional  comments:/ 
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This  item  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  checked  below/ 

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obtenir  la  meiileure  image  possible. 


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12X                              16X                              20X                              24X                              28X                              32X 

t 

tails 
I  du 
odifiar 
una 
mage 


Tha  copy  filmad  hora  hai  baan  raproducad  thanks 
to  tha  ganarosity  of: 

Library  Division 

Provincial  Archives  of  British  Columbia 

Tha  imagas  appearing  hara  ara  tha  bast  quality 
possible  considering  the  condition  and  legibility 
of  the  original  copy  and  in  keeping  with  the 
filming  contract  specifications. 


Original  copies  in  printed  paper  covers  ara  filmed 
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sion, or  the  back  cover  when  appropriate.  All 
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first  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, and  ending  on  the  last  page  with  a  printed 
or  illustrated  impression. 


The  last  recorded  frame  on  each  microfiche 
shall  contain  tha  symbol  —^  (meaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  V  (meaning  "END"), 
whichever  applies. 

Maps,  plates,  charts,  etc.,  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entiraly  included  in  one  exposure  ara  filmad 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  frames  as 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


L'exemplaire  film4  fut  reproduit  grAce  A  la 
gAnirositA  da: 

Library  Division 

Provincial  Archives  of  British  ColumhM 

Las  images  suivantas  ont  AtA  raproduites  avac  la 
plus  grand  soin,  compta  tenu  de  la  condition  at 
da  la  nattetA  da  l'exemplaire  film*,  et  en 
conformity  avac  las  conditions  du  contrat  da 
filmaga. 

Les  exemplaires  originaux  dont  la  couvertura  an 
papier  est  imprimAe  sont  filmAs  en  commengant 
par  la  premier  plat  at  an  terminant  soit  par  la 
darniAre  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration,  soit  par  la  socond 
plat,  salon  le  cas.  Tous  les  autres  exemplaires 
originaux  sont  film6s  an  commengant  par  la 
premiere  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration  et  en  terminant  par 
la  darniAre  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 

Un  des  symboles  suivants  apparaitra  sur  la 
darnidre  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  selon  le 
cas:  la  symbole  — ^  signifie  "A  SUIVRE",  le 
symbole  V  signifie  "FIN  ". 

Les  cartas,  planches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvent  Atre 
filmAs  A  des  taux  Ja  reduction  diffArants. 
Lorsqua  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  Atre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  clichA,  il  est  filmA  A  partir 
de  Tangle  supArieur  gauche,  de  gauche  A  droite, 
et  de  haut  an  bas,  an  pranant  le  nombre 
d'images  nAcessaire.  Les  diagrammas  suivants 
illustrent  la  mAthoda. 


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SPEECH 

ov 
R.   M.   T.    HUNTEK,   OF    VIRGINIA, 

ON. 

On  the  resolution  of  notice  to  Great  IhHuin  to  abrogate  the  convention  of  joint 
occupancy  relative  to  the  Oregon  territory. 


DELIVERED  IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES,  JANUARY  10,  1848. 


' 


Mr.  HUNTER  rose  and  addreased  the  House 
M  follow* : 

Mr.  Cumrman:  1  was  one  of  those  who  regretted 
that  ibis  debate  should  have  arisen  when  it  did.  I 
regarded  it  as  (ircnviture  and  unfortunate,  and  I 
feared  that  it  inii;ht  udd  u>  the  difficulties  in  the  way 
of  a  wise  and  dispassionate  settlemtnt  of  the  ques- 
tion  before  us.  But,  so  much  has  now  been  said, 
that  a  yet  fuller  development  of  the  opinion  of  this 
House  is  perhaps  due  to  the  cuuntry,  and  oiurselves. 
For  myself,  1  have  been  the  more  anxious  to  ex* 
press  my  opinions  at  an  early  stage  of  the  debate, 
because  I  foresaw  that  I  should  be  separated  from 
many,  perhaps  from  most  of  my  political  friends 
upon  the  question  before  us.  I  am  happy  to  believe, 
however,  that  the  differences  between  us  are  not  so 
wide  and  deep  as  to  be  irreconcilable.  This  difier- 
cnce  relates  not  somuch  to  the  end  which  we  all  desire 
to  attain,  us  to  the  means  by  which  it  is  to  be  pur- 
sued. From  whut  I  have  fathered  of  the  opinions 
of  this  House,  I  believe  that  all  desire  the  pos- 
Keasion  of  Ores^on,  not  only  up  to  the  parallel  of  49°, 
but  to  that,  of  54°  40.'  Nearly  all,  so  far  as  I  am 
informed,  believe  tliat  our  title  to  this  country  is 
good,  not  only  to  the  43th  parallel,  but  up  to  that  of 
54°  40\  I,  for  one,  entertain  that  opinion.  The 
whole  question  between  us  is  as  tu  the  best  and 
wisest  means  of  attaining  an  end  which  we  all  equal> 
ly  desire.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  expresseu  the 
opinion,  that,  without  regard  to  the  distinctions  of 
party  or  of  sections,  all  of  us  desire  the  possession 
of  the  whole  territory  in  Oregon,  to  which  we  are 
entitled.  There  is  no  man  with  an  American  heart 
in  his  liosom  who  could  be  insensible  to  the  pros- 
pect  of  planting  our  fla^'  and  our  settlements  upon 
ilie  shores  of  the  Pacific,  There  is  no  suclv  bosom 
which  woujd  not  swell  with  emotions  of  hope  and 
of  pride  at  the  prospect  of  the  influence,  commercial, 
I)olitical,and  military,  which  we  should  derive  from 
u  position  on  the  shores  of  Oregon  and  California, 
should  we  be  so  fortunate  as  to  be  able  to  obtain  the 
last  by  just  and  equitable  means.  Looking  to  the 
map  of  the  globe,  and  taking  the  world  over  with 
a  view  to  its  Rocinl  and  political  relations,  and  to 
physical  characteristics,  there  is  no  such  position 
6a  luilitiu-y  strcujjiii  uiid  conuuercial  ^iuprcutucy,  lu 


we  shall  occupy  if  our  settlements  should  cover  th« 
whole  breadth  of  the  continent  from  the  Atlantic  to 
the  Pacific  ocean,  underour  present  form  of  goyeni« 
ment.  In  the  centre,  lien  the  vast  valley  of  the  MiMU*- 
sippi,  destined  to  be  not  only  the  hive,  but  tb* 
storehouse  of  nations,  and  impregnably  secured  b<^ 
hind  the  Alleghanies  on  the  one  side,  and  0\B 
Rocky  mountains  on  the  otiter.  In  time  of 
war,  a  mighty  reserve,  ready  to  debouch  OB 
either  the  Atlantic  or  the  Pacific  slope,  to  orw 
whelm  witli  irresistible  force  any  foreigti  invaaion, 
an<l  able  in  time  of  peace — teeming,  as  it  will  b«^ 
with  people  and  rcsource»— to  cherish  and  suaiain 
a  vaat.commerce  on  either  sea.  From  the  Chem* 
peake  northward,  our  harbora  .and  rivera,  coinaitt- 
nicating  witit  vast  inland  seas,  give  us  the  mo# 
commanding  commercial  position  on  the  vast  boain 
of  the  Atlantic,  which  receives  the  waters  and  the 
commerce  of  most  of  tlie  large  rivers  of  the  world. 
With  Oregon  and  California,  our  position  on  tlie 
Pacific  would  he  nearly  nscon.manding.  We  should 
hold  the  advanced  posts  on  the  line  of  commercial 
interchanges  between  the  civilized  portion  of  the 
world,  and  most  of  that  which  is  semi-civilized  or 
barbarous;  and  we  should  probably  become  th* 
centre  of  commercial  transit  between  the  two  aeaii> 
The  possession  of  Ore;."  ,  and  the  peaceful  acqui- 
sition of  California,  wo^,-  place  this  Union  in  a  po- 
sition of  impregnable  strength  and  stable  greatncAt* 
vnthorrfiann  on  the  Atlantic  sea  and  the  other  on 
the  Pacific  shore,  ready  to  strike  in  either  direction 
with  a  rapidity  and  an  efficiency  not  to  be  rivalled 
by  any  nation  on  the  earth. 

I  know  that  these  spcculadona  oa  the  future  ore 
uncertain  and  often  dangerous;  but  it  would  seem  to 
lie  next  to  impossible  «that,  with  this  position,  and 
with  all  these  elements  of  military  strength  and  of 
political  and  commerciol  greatness,  we  should  not 
be  able,  not  only  to  commeMd  the  largest  share  of 
the  commerce  of  both  seas,  but  also  t«  protect  and 
advance  the  march  of  civilization  throughout  thd 
entire  extent  of  this  continent.  With  theae  view* 
of  the  subject,  how  could  I  be  insensible  to  the  im- 
portance of  maintaining  our  claims  to  Oretrott?  But 
ahall  we  best  promote  our  purpoae  by  adopting  tli* 
recommcuduliuu  uf  iIm  Coaauw*tea  oa  Foreiga  A£> 


ILibJJU 


'i 


tain  in  relation  to  the  notice?  With  great  defer- 
ence to  their  matured  and,  perhapa,  better  opinion, 
I  must  aay  that  I  think  not.  To  dctcrnriine  this 
queation,  it  will  be  ncceaaary  to  aacertain,  oa  far  oa 
possible,  the  probable  conaequcnces  of  either  courae, 
aa  we  may  give,  or  refuse  to  give,  the  notice  ipr  the 
termination  of  the  convention  of  joint  occupancy. 

Let  us,  then,  Mr.  Chairman,  ex'*'  'nc  this  qura- 
tion  calmly  and  dispsoaioimtclv.  Let  us  view  this 
aubject  under  none  of  the  hallacinalionsof  r  itioruil 
.pride;  let  us  approach  it  in  no  boanful  or  braggart 
spirit,  and  witn  no  disposition  to  use  it  as  the  mere 
meana  of  flattering  national  vanity.  Let  us  come 
to  it  in  tliat  higher  spirit  which  conscious  strength 
should  inspire — with  the  feelings  of  thoue  who  are 
too  well  satisfied  of  our  title  to  the  reN|)ect  of  the 
world,  and  of  our  ability  to  hold  our  own,  to  be- 
lieve that  it  can  either  be  necessary  or  dignified  to 
deal  in  extravagant  pretension  or  cxaggtrated  asser- 
tion. If  there  be  such  a  spirit  of  inquiry  in  thia  body 
to  which  I  may  addrca  myself,  1  would  ask,  what 
are  to  be  tltecoiiscquenccHif^we  give  t'lc  notice'  If  the 
notice  bo  given,  the  beat  result  which  ca.^  possibly  flow 
from  it  will  be  anudjiistmentof  the  difficulty  by  trea- 
ty, upon  the  basis  of  a  boundary  on  the  49ih  parallel 
of  latitude.  Under  ex iatina;  circumstances,  we  can 
expect  no  better  treaty,  and  it  is  manifest  that  we 
'will  take  nothing  worse.  It  is  absurd  to  Ruppnse 
that  Great  Britain  will  offer  to  give  ua  more  thou 
•wo  have  agreed  to  take.  If  this  matter  be  amicably 
adjusted,  it  is  evident,  under  the  existing  Htatc  of 
the  negotiations,  that  we  get  nothing  bcyund  the 
49th  parallel.  Now,  Mr.  Chairmon,  such  an  ad- 
juRtmcnt,  in  my  opinion,  would  be  fUr  hiVcr  than 
the  doubtful  chances  of  a  war  under  the  circum- 
stances which  at  present  surround  us.  But  I  should 
■rertainly  prefer  the  whole  country  up  to  54'^  40',  if 
there  1)0  means  compatible  with  the  peace  and  honor 
of  the  nation,  na  1  think  there  are,  by  which  we 
should  probably  obtain  the  whole  territory.  But 
how  do  those  gentleman  aland  who  support  this 
reaolution  as  a  peaceful  measure,  and  yet  maintain 
that  we  can  lake  nothing  less  than  our  whole  claim 
on  Oregon.  If  the  measure  l>e  peaceful,  is  it  not 
manifest  ih.tt,  by  adopting  it,  they  essentially  aban- 
don the  whole  country  north  of  the  49lh  parallel? 
If  they  adopt  it  as  the  means  of  obtaining  the  whole 
country,  they  can  only  do  so  upon  the  supposition 
that  it  13  to  lead  to  war,  and  that  thus  we  shall  ob- 
tain the  whole.  I  shall  presently  endeavor  to  ascer- 
tain what  would  be  the  probable  consequences  under 
that  conjuncture  of  circumstances.  But  here  I  must 
pause  to  say,  that  I  do  not  mean  to  disparage  or 
disapprove  ihe  proposition  made  by  the  ndministra- 
^on  to  settle  the  question  amicably  upon  the  basis 
of  ^  boundary  along  the  49th  pnrallct.  Under  the 
circumstances,  and  fVom  the  course  of  previous  ne- 
gotiations, the  President  could  have  oonc  no  less 
than  to  have  made  ^uch  an  offer.  It  was  due  to 
public  opinion-at  home  and  abroad,  it  was  due  to 
our  natioual  character,  and  the  great  interests  of 
humanity,  that  he  should  tnanifest  a  desire  to  do 
much  for  on  honorable  peace.  The  terms  whicli  he 
offered  would  have  been  considered  by  each  party 
to  the  dispute  as  falling  short  of  the  full  measure  of 
their  just  claims,  but  in  the  more  impartial,  but,  per- 
hapa, less  informed  opinion  of  the  residue  of  the 
civilized  world,  they  would  have  been  regarded  as 
fair,  equitable,  and  honorable  to  both  countries.  He 
would  have  done  much,  too,  for  the  country  in 
thus  securing,  by  peaceful  and  honorable  means, 
tun  Bdvaneed  post  for  our  population  up  to  the  49th 


parallel.  He  would  have  acquired,  as  far  as  I  have 
been  able  to  inform  myself,  much  the  most  valuable 
portion  of  the  country,  both  for  commercial  and 
agricultural  purposes.  I  know  tliut  the  chairman 
of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  has  expressed 
a  dilfcrcnt  opinion.  But  with  great  deference  and 
respect  for  that  opinion,  I  must  l>e  allowed  to  do- 
chirc  my  diosent  from  it.  The  opposite  opinion  ex- 
preHAcd  by  Mr.  Grcenhow,  to  whose  enlightened 
researches  the  country  is  so  much  indebted,  seems  to 
me  to  be  sustiiined  upon  better  grounds.  The  har- 
bor of  Port  Discovery,  of  which  Vancouver  speaks 
in  terms  fo  high,  and  the  harbors  on  Admiralty 
inlet,  are  s.iid  to  be  admirably  adapted  to  the  uses  of 
comini:rce. 

As  I  am  informed,  they  arc  better  not  only  in  nat- 
ural rapacity,  but  from  position,  than  those  higher 
up  on  the  coast.  Of  the  superior  agricultural  ad- 
vant.<gesof  the  portion  of  Ihe  territory  below  tha 
49th  parallel,  I  presume  there  cnn  be  no  doubt, 
and  I  think  they  are  very  generally  udrniited.  The 
President  might  well  suppose  that  he  would  effect 
much  in  securing  the  peaceful  progress  of  our  in- 
fant Hi'lllement  in  Oregon  up  to  the  49ih  parallel;  and 
this  being  done,  he  might  nafely  leave  it  to  time  and 
Americiin  cnieiiirise  to  do  the  real.  But,  Mr. 
Chairman,  let  me  return  to  the  inquiry  into  the 
probable  consequences  ofgiving  thin  notice.  I  havo 
said  that  the  beat  possible  result  would  be  an  adjust- 
ment on  the  basis  of  a  boundary  along  the  49th 
parallel;  but  I  have  seen  nothing  as  yet  t )  convince 
me  that  it  was  the  most  probable  resuU.  If  tlie 
minister  from  Great  Britain  refused  to  consider  this 
pro])oaition,  when  made  in  the  course  of  an  amica- 
ble and  courteous  correspondence,  is  it  very  proba- 
ble that  she  will  be  more  inclined  to  accept  it  when 
we  give  the  notice,  under  circumstances  which  im- 
ply that  she  must  cither  agree  to  our  proposition,  or 
go  o  war  for  the  whole  country?  !f  the  British 
minister  represented  the  real  views  of  his  govern- 
ment, is  it  probftble  that  with  their  dispositions  that 
government  will  be  the  more  inclined  to  accept  our 
offer  on  account  of  the  threat  which  it  may  suppose 
to  be  implied  by  our  giving  the  notice?  If  she  re- 
ally designs  to  go  to  war,  rather  than  compromise 
upon  the  terms  which  we  proposed,  is  there  anv- 
thing  unreasonable  in  supposing  that  she  might 
think  the  present  time  and  circumstances  tis  favora- 
ble as  any  likely  to  occur  fin-  striking  the  blow?  If  she 
rea'ily  nitaclies  the  importanceto  her  whole  claim  on 
Oregon,  which  many  seem  to  imagine,  and  regards  a 
war  for  it  as  inevitable,  will  she  not  think  tnat  the 
sooner  she  strikes  the  blow  the  better  for  her?  Or  if,  on 
the  other  hand,  she  is  anxious  to  settle  the  question 
amicably,  and  desires  nothing  more  than  terras 
which  may  be  regaitlcd  as  honorable  by  her  ov,.i 
people  and  by  the  world,  will  this  spirit  be  conciliated 
by  our  giving  the  notice,  and  by  the  circumstances 
under  which  it  will  be  given?  To  sum  up  the  whole, 
ii»  it  not  manifest,  on  the  one  hand,  that  if  this  step 
should  lead  to  war,  we  give  to  Great  Britain,  ir  - 
stead  <jf  reserving  it  to  ourselves,  the  advantage  of 
choosing  her  own  time  for  it?  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
this  be  designed  as  a  peace  measure,  is  it  not  mors 
likely  to  defeat,  than  to  encourage  a  renewal  of  ne- 
gotiations in  a  sensitive  and  high  spirited  people? 
Such  seems  to  me  to  be  its  probable  ten- 
dencies; and  unless  Great  Britain  should  think; 
this  disputed  territory  to  be  of  little  value 
to  her,  nowever  important  it  might  be  to  us, 
and  unless  she  entertains  a  strong  desire  for  peace, 
I  can  see  no  other  result  to  flow  from  this  notice  so 


far  aa  I  have 
moat  valuable 
inmeruial  and 

the  chairman 
huaexprcascd 
(lefcrennc  and 
allowed  to  do- 
te opinion  ex* 
tnliglitened 
itioed,  Hccinn  to 
da.  The  har- 
icouver  spcakii 
on  Admiralty 
J  to  the  uses  of 

ot  only  in  nat- 
n  those  higher 
jriculiurul  ud- 
ory  helow  thfli 
lifi  no  doubt, 
nutted.    The 
ic  would  effect 
•csa  of  our  in- 
h  parallel;  and 
e  it  to  time  and 
;8t.     Hut,  Mr. 
iquiry  into  the 
notice.     I  have 
Id  be  anadju8t« 
along  the  49th 
yret  t  >  convince 
resuU.     If  the 
to  consider  this 
ic  of  an  nmica- 
it  very  proba- 
)  accept  it  when 
nces  which  im- 
r  proposition,  or 
!f  the  British 
of  his  govern- 
li^position.s  that 
ed  to  accept  our 
it  may  suppose 
tice?    If  she  re» 
nn  compromise 
!,  is  thtrc  anv- 
Ihnt  she  might 
nccs  tia  favora- 
iheblow?  If  she 
whole  claim  on 
p,  nnd  regards  a 
;  think  tnat  the 
For  hor.?  Or  if,  on 
tie  the  question 
•re  than    terms 
Ic  by  lier  ov..i 
•it  be  conciliated 
e  circumstance! 
n  up  the  whole, 
that  if  this  step 
cat  Britain,  ir  - 
le  advantage  of 
the  other  hand, 
,  is  it  not  more 
1  renewal  of  ne> 
spirited  people? 
probable     ten- 
should    think 
>f    little    value 
gilt    be    to  ufl, 
esire  for  peace, 
a  this  notice  M 


probable  as  that  of  war.  One  thing  is  prrfectly  I 
dear;  this  measure  must  either  lead  to  a  settlement 
on  the  basis  of  a  boundary  along  the  49th  parallel, 
or  it  must  produce  war.  Our  western  friends  say 
that  they  will  be  content  with  noihin|(  less  than  the 
whole  extent  of  our  claim;  and  if  this  be  so,  is  not 
war  ineviiaule,  under  present  circumstances.'  If  war 
is  to  be  the  mode  of  settling  this  qu  stion  at  lust,  it 
would  seem  to  mc  that  it  would  be  far  wiser  to  pre- 
serve  the  present  slute  of  affairs,  that  we  may  be 
able  lo  choose  our  own  lime  for  fighting,  and  velcct 
a  period  when  we  were  better  prepared  for  the  con- 
(cst,  and  when  the  attendant  circumstances  might  l>e 
moi't'  propitious.  Let  us  look,  Mr.  Chairman,  into 
the  oircuin'UuncL'S  under  which  this  war  would  now  ' 
be  WEigcJ,  anil  aseerlnin,  if  we  ctui,  iu<  probable  con- 
sequences. Have  wc  made  any  of  the  military 
prtparations  ncccsHory  lor  such  an  event?  Would 
ont,  or  evtn  two  yt'ui»,  suffice  for  the  prcpai'iitioii 
proper  fur  such  a  contcBi.'  If  war  be  ineviiu'olc,  is 
not  our  internal  condition  such  a:^  to  make  dcl.iy 
desirable'  The  whole  country  is  just  rerovcring 
from  a  der|)  flnancial  dcprtssion.  Many  of  the 
States  arc  either  unable,  or  barely  able,  to  pay  their 
own  debts.  They  are  not  in  a  condition  to  bear 
the  weight  of  internal  taxation,  which  must  be  one 
of  the  main  resources  of  the  war.  A  few  years 
hence,  a  different  and  more  favoral)le  stain  of  thinga 
might  be  fairly  expected.  What,  let  me  ask,  would 
be  our  potuiion  in  the  public  opinion  of  the  world.' 
We  break  oil'  the  negotiation  because  out  proposi-  < 
.tion  was  not  accepted,  and  we  give  the  notice  under  | 
circumstances  which  proclaim  that  there  must  be ' 
war,  unless  she  will  settle  the  question  upon  our  own  ! 
terms.  She  has  offered  us  a  mode  of  settling  this, 
dispute,  now  universally  regarded  amongst  civilized  ! 
nations  as  a  fair  and  honorable  method  of  adju.iiing  ' 
national  controversies — I  mean  arliitration.  This,' 
We  have  already  refused;  nor  do  I  disapprove  of 
that  refusal,  under  the  circumstances  then  exiRting. 
6he  will  probably  offur  it  a^ain,  and  we  8';ull  iig^iin 
refuse  it.  I  do  not  stand  here,  Mr.  Clininiiun,  as 
the  advocate  of  arbitration;  upon  that  qucstinn  I 
have  nothing  to  say  at  present;  I  am  merely  defil- 
ing in  facts,  wiih  a  view  to  the  consequences. 
Wc  shallagain  refuse  arbitration,  Mr.  Clmiririan;  and 
why.'  Because  wo  say  there  are  none  of  the  nntion.s 
of  the  world  whose  governments  arc  honest  and  im- 
partial eDou^li  to  decide  this  controversy  between  us 
This  may  all  be  so;  but  will  a  refusal  of  tirbiiration 
for  such  reasons  be  likely  to  win  us  much  of  the 
sympathy  of  the  worm?  Under  these  circum- 
stances, am  1  wrong  in  supposing  that  the  world 
will  be  apt  to  legard  us  as  the  aggressor?  The  pub- 
lic opinion  of  Christendom  would  be  thus  deH'  d  at 
the  time  when  Great  Britain  has  a  better  un'icr- 
Standing  with  the  continental  states  of  Europe  than 
she  has  ever  enjoyed  at  any  previous  period  of  her 
history,  so  far  as  I  am  acquainted  v/ltli  it.  The 
"conlial  understanding"  between  herselfand  France, 
her  ancient  enemy  and  our  former  ally,  is  notori>'":i 
throughout  the  world.  Under  these  cirbum-ian- 
ces,  what  chance  should  we  have  fur  cither  syinpa 
thy  or  assistance  from  any  of  these  powers  in  the 
event  of  a  war?  But  this  is  not  the  whole  view  of 
the  existing  state  of  our  furci^  relations,  and  its 
connexion  with  our  prospects  m  a  war.  If  we  have 
a  war  with  Great  Britain  about  this  time,  shall  we 
not  probably  have  Mexico  also  on  our  hands?  It 
is  kiiown  that  she  is  sore  under  recent  occurrences, 
and  it  is  equally  notorious  that  she  is  much  under 
British  influencs.    We  should  probably  hare  a  war 


notonly  fur  Oregon,  but  Texas  also.  Ths  Indian 
tribes  beyond  the  Rocky  mountains  are  known  to  be 
under  the  influence  of  the  Iludsitn  Bay  Companjr, 
and  it  is  probable  that  moat  of  the  weitem  liniiaiis 
would  take  sides  with  Great  Britain  in  the  event  of 
n  war  between  her  and  this  country.  Under  these 
circumstances,  what  would  become  ofOrernn,  and  of 
our  infant  settlements  on  the  Columbia?  I  lielieve  it 
is  the  opinion  of  our  best  military  autl'oriiira,  and, 
indeed,  the  very  general  opinion,  that,  during  the 
war,  Oregon  it^iclf  must  be  abandoned.  And  that  ws 
should  have  to  strike  in  anada,  and  upon  the  seas. 
And  yet  eenilnmcn  coolly  d>>mand  war,  or  what 
will  lead  to  war,  as  a  duty  which  wn  owe  our  |H!o- 
plc  in  Oregon,  when  it  is  nianifi'St  ihatthe  very  first 
Htr.pof  that  war  would  be  to  abanihin  Ihim  unpro- 
tected to  nriti.-<h  troops,  lo  the  Hudson  B:iy  Com- 
pany, and  their  savage  allies — to  a  war,  unless  they 
ut  uniu:  made  terniM  lor  themselves,  as  likely  lo  bo 
signalized  by  all  the  rirciimstunecH  of  barbnrie 
atroriiy  as  any  o''which  we  hnvcf  an  account.  Those 
iinforhinaip  ptnple  i.>i'^ht  well  ask  the  chairman  of 
Foreign  Affairs  if  this  be  what  he  cidls  "  acking  of 
hi.i  friendx?"  In  snch  a  contcat,  is  it  not  proimble 
that  Oregon  would  be  lost  only  to  be  recovered,  if 
ever,  l<y  another  war,  to  be  undertaken  at  a  nioro 
aiispiciinis  period?  If  this  siru:;gle  were  now  to  be 
commenced,  I  do  not  believe  that  there  would  even 
be  an  effort  made  to  send  troops  to  Oregon.  It 
would  be  regarded  ns  a  w.iste  nf  men  and  nsuans,  at 
a  time  when,  with  Mexico  to  the  southwest,  with  the 
Indian  tribes  on  our  western  frontier,  wi'h  British 
and  Canadian  troops  on  our  north,  and  with  British 
fleets  covering  the  easiern  and  southern  line  of  our 
const,  wc  shou'd  be  rncirilcd  as  with  a  wall  nf  fire.  I 
doubt  not  but  that  we  should  emerge  from  it  victo- 
rious. It  is  not  on  the  soil  which  we  occupy  that 
we  can  be  eonquered,  or  even  be  worsted.  I  hnve 
full  faith  in  Americin  spirit  and  putiintism.  But  I 
do  not  believe  that  wc  s^iould  iia-'surscathed  thr<iui(h 
that  fiery  trial,  nor  on^hi  we  to  tuNk  too  highly 
tho.sc  gicatqiialiiies  of  our  people  I'y  cxoosiog  them 
to  uiiiieeessary  ilifficiiltit  s,  as  we  should  do  if  we  en- 
gaje  ill  a  war  before  v*e  iire  prepared  for  it.  or  if  wo 
make  war  toallai'i  what  miijlit  lie  had  far  more  cer- 
tainly and  hnn  iralily  liy  peac  fiil  mea  s.  That  we 
should  come  out  of  s  ich  i\  C'>nt)8t  with  honor,  I  do 
not  doubt;  but  that  weshoidd  lose  as  much  or  more 
of  Oregon  than  w.iuld  be  given  up  by  any  treaty 
likely  to  I'emade,  I  rcgird  a-<  hNo  probable  If  war 
be  the  only  nioile  of  maintaining  our  rich  s  in  Ore- 
gon, that  war  ou!»ht  to  be  def  rird,  as  it  is  miiiifest 
ihiit  our  I  luuireM  for  snee.es  i  m  :St  n^  reU'^e  with  cv^ 
ry  year  of  delay.  But  if  ilierc  be  pf'airriil  and  hon- 
orable means  (aa  I  shall  end  avoi  ro  show  hereafter) 
which  wouM  m.ire  pro  'ably  give  ns  the  wliolc  terri- 
tory, we  owe  it  to  oui'selvi  s  and  to  the  world  to  adopt 
them. 

But  gcnilemen  have  promised  that  if  war  be  once 
commenced  with  Great  Britain,  we  shall  terminate 
ii.  by  driving  her  from  this  con  incnt,  and  depriving 
her  of  all  that  she  claims  or  possesses  upon  it.  I 
do  not  stand  here,  Mr  Chairman,  to  take  issue  with 
that  proposition;  I  mean  neither  to  aflii'm  nor  deny 
it.  I  will  not  even  ask  if  ''our  old  men  see  visions 
and  our  young  men  dream  dreams  "  I  will  suppoas 
the  anticipation  to  be  true;  and  I  shall  endeavor  to 
trace  such  a  war  as  this  would  be  to  its  oonwc^iien- 
ues,  to  see  if  the  chanoe  or  the  certainty  of  acquirinf 
Oregon  a  few  years  somer,  would  coRiiiensale  ua 
for  them. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  know  of  no  inslancs  in  which    « 


faiidohiphiindTAg  tfli  itidep«ridcrte«,ftnd  the  itquolity 
•Mppowd  to    remit    from    it.  hu    yielded  up  the 
Vhuk  Mubjvct  of  dUpute  which  had  led  to  the  ware 
There  i«,  U  in  true,  more  than  one  shining  iriNtanc. 
in  whic}i  a  nation   ha.s  conquered  itH  indeprndcnc'b 
without  imPttiring  the  position  of  criuality  of  it.s  op- 
ponenl.    There  uro  instances,  too,  in  which  a  con- 
quered people  hiivc  yielded  all.     But  I  know  of  no 
treaty  in  modern  times,  between  equals,  in  which 
one  of  the  jwrtiea,  after  a  war,  liaa  given  up  the 
whole  subject  in  controversy  without  an  e(|nival(.nt. 
There  may  be  such  instances,  but  1  do  not  rcmciu- 
ber  one,  even  in  the  most  Hucressful  period  of  the 
career  of  iS'aiMJJcon.    Neither  Miirenijo  nor  Austcr- 
]itz't;ver  gave  him   such  results  in  liis  trentiesv/ilh 
Austria.    Of  all  the  Europeim  nations,  Great  Brit- 
ain is  the  moHt  di3tin<;uished  for  the  pertinacity  with 
which  siie  has  hitherto  Kirugg'e'l  for  her  riijhts  and 
her  honor.     Nov/,  Mr.  Chairman,   ia  there  a  niiui 
amonj^si  us  wiio  supposes — docs  the  wildest  dream- 
er of  us  all    believe — that    she    would    ever  clone 
a  war  by  yielding  not  only  the  whole  subject  in  dis- 
pute, but  her  own  undoubted   territory  until  she  hud 
£rsl  waged  it,  and  been  defeated  in  it,  us  a  war  not 
only  of  raa.stery,  but  of  existence?    Would  her  .sa- 
gacious statesmen   be  slow    to  perceive  that  any 
treaty  which  branded  her  with  the  visible  stamp  of 
inferiority  alter  a  war,  would  be  the  sure  precursor 
of   her    downfall?    She    knows    that  the  hungry 
and  expectant  eye  of  contineiital   Europe  is  fixed 
upon  the  prey  which  a  division  of  her  mighty  em- 
pire would  afford.     She  is  uwurc,  too,  that  the  cal- 
culation has  already  been  made  as  to  how   far  the 
invention   of  steam  ha.s  destroyed  the  security  of 
ber  natural  defences — of  her  insular  position.     Site 
no  longer  feels  able  to  continue  the  proud  bon^t  that 
^'Britannia  needs  no  bulwarks,  no  towers  along  the 
,  Btcep;"  for  she  is  now  engaged  in  constructing  coast 
defences.  She  must  feel  that  the  whole  charm  of  her 
power  lies  in  the  idea  of  her  invincibility  on  tlic  st^as 
and  in  her  colonial  poKsessions.    To  destroy  by  her 
one  act  this  idea,  would  be  to  hold  forth  the  .signal  for 
the  eagles  to  gather  to  the  banquet,  and  would  involve 
the  losa  of  power,  empire,  and  churucteritself.  Can  I 
be  mistaken  insuppoving  that  a  war  which  brought 
her  to  such  a  conclusion,   would   probably  be  the 
longest  and  bloodiest  ever  known  in  the  annals  of 
mankind  ?     Gentlemen    have  promi.sed  that    this 
thine  shall  be  done.    I  do  not  stand  her  to  dispute 
it.    In  the  event  of  a  war,  I  wish  that  they  may 
be  able  to  make  good    llicir  words.     But  before 
this  can  be  accomplished,  we  must  track  the  British 
lion  in  his  blood  from  the  rining  to  the  setting  sun. 
"We  must  hunt  him  from  stronghold  to  stronghold, 
until  we  have  pursued  him  throughout  the  circum- 
ference of  the  elobe.     Every  sea,  every  rlime  must 
become    familiar  with  the  noise    of    the    terrific 
strife.     Far  distant  people,  nations  to  whom  as  yet 
we  are  scarcely  known,    must  be  startled  at  the 
apparhion  of  this  new  power  which  in  to  struggle 
with  Urcat  Britain  for  the  mastery  in  places  where 
■he  had  long  reigned  the  roost  supreme.    From 
Aden  to  the  Ionian  isles  we  must  pursue  her  over 
wave  and  through   fortress,  on  one  continuous  line 
of  blood  and  fire,  until  we  have  swept  her  Hag  from 
the  Roas,  and  buried  her  fleets  in  the  ocean.    We 
muat  throw  down  her  places  of  strength;  we  must 
despoil  even  her  gardens  of  "pleasaunce."    Yes, 
till   to  tliia  dreadful  extremity  must  we  bring  her, 
before  she  can  acree  to  concfude  the  contest  upon 
terms  which  wouui  destroy  her  most  cherished  sen- 
timent of  national  pride,  and  probably  lead  to  the 


destruction  of  the  mightiest  empire  which,  as  yet, 
the  world  has  known. 

If  we  are  to  obtain  what  gentlemen  have  promiaed 
us,    such    mam  bo    the   war  which    we    are  to 
wage,    What,  Mr.   Chairman,   must  be  the  con- 
sequences of  such  a  war  upon  ourselves  and  our  in- 
K.titutiona  ?  Who  can  foresee  tliese  consequences  in  all 
their  extent,  or  undertake  to  measure  ihe  results? 
How    great    would    be    the  danger  of  a  centrali- 
zation   of    all     power    in    the      federal    govern- 
ment, and  of  an  obliteration  of  tht  lines   of  State 
authority?    How    many    hundreds  of  millions   of 
debt  should  we  entail  on  ourselves  and  our  posteri- 
ty?    How  far  shoilld  wo  fhll  into  the  lower  depths 
of  the  paper  sygtem?    To  how  distant  a  day  in  the 
Greek    calends    should   we    postpone  those  great 
democratic  rcforins  which  we  had   fondly  hoped  wc 
were  about  to  introduce,  and    for  which  we  have 
labored  sn  long  and  often  with   such   doubtful  suc- 
ccHH?    We  should  go   into  the  war  a  free,  happy, 
and   moral  people,     Who  can  undertake  to  foretell 
the  extent  and  nature  of  the  transformations  which 
wc  may  undergo  before  wc  come  out  of  it,  or  who 
can  measure  the  waste  of  all  the  elements  of  hu- 
man happiness  and  social  order  which  such  a  wai' 
would  occasion?    Should  we  be  justified  in  tht  eyes 
of  God,  or  of  mankind,  for  thus  perilling  the  great 
interests  of  our  country  and  of  numanity  for  the 
sake  of  obtaining  possession  of  Oregon  a  few  years 
earlier,  when  we  arc  sure  of  acquiring  it  a  little  la- 
ter by   honorable  and   peaceful  means?    Could  wo 
be  justified  in  exposing  the  country  to   sue'   ex- 
tremity if  there  be  even  a  probable  chance    of  ac- 
quiring the  territory  I'y  means  not  only  peaceful 
but  compatible  with  our  honor?    Or  if  war  and  such 
a  wnr  be  inevitable,  ought  we  not  to  postpone  it  un- 
til we  have  more  men,  more  means,  more  resources, 
and  more  auspicious    circumstances   for   its  com- 
mencement?   But,  Mr.   Chairman,  it  may   be  said 
that  in  my    view  of  the  probable    conseauences  of 
such  a  war  as  that  must  be  which  shoulu  lead  -to 
such  a  conclusion  as  is  promised,   I   have  virtually 
admitted  that    the    republican  system  of  policy  is 
practicable  only  in  time  of  peace.     Such  is  not  my 
opinion.     We  have  not  had   time    as  yet  to  intro- 
duce or  mature  our  system.    The  ideas  upon  whitli 
tliey   rest    iu"e  not   fully  possessed  by  tlie  public 
mind.     They  require  time  imd  a  period  of  peace  for 
their  full  development.     But  if  once  matured  and 
developed,  I  believe  they  would  enable  our  govern- 
ment and  people  to  stand  the  shock  and  pressure  of 
war  with  far  greater  ease  and  buoyancy  than  under 
any  other  course  of  policy.     I,  for  one,  am  of  the 
opinion  that  if  wewere  now  to  plunge  into  war  we 
8nould  fall  into  some  of  the  worst  forms  of  the  paper 
systciii,  owing  to  the  remains  of  what  I   believe  to 
be  a  wrong  idea  once  implanted  in  the  public  mind*, 
and  yet  I   oelieve  that  the  expenses  of  a  war  could 
be  far  better  sdAtained  without  these  abuses  of  that 
system  than  with  them.     I  have  long'  thought  that 
we  suffered  almost  as  much  in  the  last    war  from 
such  abuses  ns  from  the  British  troops.     But,  Mr. 
Chairnian,  I  have  y«t  another  answer.    Tin-  »eniuB 
of  our  institutions  is  pacific — they  were  not  organ- 
ized for  distant  and  offensive  warfare.    For  deffen- 
sive  war  1  believe  they  are  the  strongest  in  the  world, 
for  they  bring  to  its  aid  the  united  hearts  of  our  peo- 
ple.   We  were  not  organized  for  a  career  of  war  and 
conquest,  and  I  thank  Qod  for  it;  for  then  we  should 
have  required  a  fur  more  despotic  form  of  govern- 
ment, and  we  might  have  stood  as  fair  a  chance  as 
any  to  become  the  curse  of  mankind,  instead  of  being 


irbich,  M  yet, 

mre  promiaed 

we    are  to 

be  the  con- 

fs  and  our  in- 

equencen  in  all 

!  ihc   results.' 

of  a  ccntrali- 

eral    govcrn- 

inea   of  State 

if  millions    of 

our  posteri- 

lower  drplhH 

a  day  in  the 

e  ihosc  grent 

idly  hopeil  we 

vhirh  we  liave 

doulitful   BUC- 

B  free,  happy, 

lake  lo  foretell 

nations  which 

of  it,  or  who 

mcnt«  of  hu- 

such  a  wai" 

led  in  tlit  eyes 

lling  the  great 

lanity  for  the 

)n  ii  few  years 

pt  a  little  la- 

ns?    Could  wo 

to     sue'    IX- 

chance   ot  ac- 
only  peaceful 
war  and  such 
postpone  it  un> 
nore  resources, 
for   its  com- 
tnay   be  said 
onseauences  of 
shoulu  lead  -to 
have  virtually 
m  of  policy  is 
uch  is  not  my 
us  yet  to  intro- 
eaa  upon  which 
by  ilie  public 
iod  of  peace  for 
:e  matured  and 
blc  our  govcrn- 
and  pressure  of 
ncy  than  under 
one,  am  of  the 
ige  into  war  we 
•msofthe  paper 
lat  I   believe  to 
:hc  public  mind; 
of  a  war  could 
abuses  of  that 
ig  thought  that 
last    war  from 
)ops.     Out,  Mr. 
cr.    Till-  'eniuB 
^ere  not  organ- 
re.    For  defen- 
cst  in  the  world, 
jarts  of  our  peo- 
areer  of  war  and 
then  we  should 
form  of  govern- 
fair  a  chance  as 
inatend  of  being 


c5 


heir  benefacton,  oa  I  maintain  we  hare  been  by 
he  exanpie  of  our  inatitutiona  and  our  progresa. 
Wt  have  olwaya  been  proud  to  believe  tnat  ours 
vaa  a  higher  and  more  glorious  destiny;   we  have 
Klieved  it  to  be  our  destiny  to  achieve  our  tnumpha 
n  the  useful  arts  of  peace,  to  subdue  the  difficulties 
ind  master  the  secrets  of  nature,  to  adorn  and  culti-  j 
ratathecarth,  to  introduce  a  new  and  II  higher  civili-' 
uklioii,  to  develop  better  foims  of  social  and  political ; 
>rganization,  and  to  minister  to  the  progreKS  und  the  | 
jniversal  peace  and  happiness  of  mankind  by  the  | 
)cneficcnt  example  of  a  Tree  and  happy  people,  who 
ivcre  wealthy  without  ra|iine,  strong  wiihniit  crime,  i 
jreat  without  war,  uiiu  peaceful  without  fear.    To-: 
vords  thene  n;reat  anil  benficent  ends  wo  have  already  ■ 
lone  mill  Ir.  and  in  doing  it  we  have  won  move  true  ' 
lory  lliun  if,  like  Tamerlane,  we  had  leli  pyramids  I 
)f  human  heads  us  tlii'  monuments  of  victory,  or 
ike  Atiilii  or  Aluri'',  the  scoiirp;  of  (icicl  and  the  pest 
if  natioiit),  ravaged  and  desolaled  the.  earth  in  the ; 
itorm  of  our  warfare.  Our  ihousand  of  milea  of  rail- : 
oads  and  canals  which  have  thrown  down  thu  bar- , 
■iera  of  nature  to  iho  afliliation  of  our  people,  and  to 
he  common  and  kind'y  interchange  of  po  much  that 
Tiinisters   to  the  happiness  of  man,  are  far  nobler ; 
nonuments  to  thu  genius  of  a  people  than  the  cul- 

fmn  of  TiHJan  or  Uie  palace  or  Blenheim.    These  j 
ro  the  monuments  which  are  worthy  our  name  and 
ur  destiny.  .  I 

But,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  return  to  the  inquiry  which 
was  purging.  1  have  endeavored  to  give  gentle-  j 
nen  the  advantage  of  their  own  ouppositinns;  and  j 
n  whatever  way  1  have  turned  the  tapestry  for 
hem,  the  picture  has  seemed  to  be  forbidding.  But 
nost  so  in  that  aspect  which  gave  us  the  pictiii-c  of 
var  waged  to  sucn  cxlrcmeties  ns  some  gentlemen 
lavc  ))romised.  But  ia  there  a  rr.al  prol)ability  that 
he  war  would  be  waged  to  such  extremities  by  two 
lations  whose  powers  of  mutual  annoyance  are  so 
;reat,  and  whose  capacities  for  mutual  benefit  are 
10  lar!;e?  Is  is  not  hkely  that  both  nations  would 
jrc  of  a  contest  so  destructive  and  bloody,  and  itgree 
o  terminate  it  by  an  arbitration  which,  in  the  univer- 
lal  opinion  of  the  civilized  world,  is  considered  a  fair 
md  honorable  mode  of  adjusting  national  ditfcrences? 
Sir,  1  believe  that  if  there  siiould  be  war,  it  will 
nost  probably  terminate  in  an  arbitration,  and  thus 
NG  should  have  an  arbitration  and  war,  when  we 
Arc  might  have  had  an  arbitration  without  a  war. 
]ould  any  man  hesitate  between  such  alternatives? 
iut    gentlemen    here  are    against  an  arbitration. 

myself  wish  to  avoid  it,  and  I  believe  this  may 
lusily  be  done  by  means  which  most  probably 
voufd  secure  us  tlie  whole  territory  in  peace  and 
lonor.     Let  us  refuse  to  give   the  notice;    leave 

ic  negotiations  to  aland  where  they  are;  for  we 
lave  now  done  all  that  it  becomes  us  to  do  in  the 
ine  of  negotiation.  We  have  offered  a  compromise 
ipon  liberal  terms  which  haa  been  refused,  and  we 
lave  manifested  a  proper  ieain  for  peace.  Let  ua 
low  rely  upon  &ur  ai'porior  means  of  colonization, 
jrreat  Britain  haa  elected  to  leave  the  ultimate  \K>r- 
iession  of  the  territory  to  depend  on  our  relative  ca- 
)acities  for  settling  it.  In  this  contest,  the  advan- 
ages  are  on  our  side,  and  it  must  end  in  putting  ui> 
n  possession  of  all  that  we  claim.  We  thus  avoid 
iie  chance  of  losing  the  territory  altogetlier.  There 
ire  gentlemen,  I  know,  who  are  disposed  to  smile  at 
iiis;  but  let  me  remind  them  that,  in  comparing  our- 
lelvea  with  Great  Britain,  they  must  remember  that 
iliere  are  aome  theatrea  where  we  are  her  superior, 
liicre  are  others  where   we    ore  her   equal,  and 


there  are  othera,  again,  upoit  which  peculiar  and 
sometimea  transient  circumstancea  give  her  tho  su- 
periority.    In  a  war  for  Oregon,  at  this  time,  she 
(mssesaes  superior  advantages  in  her  longeaiablish- 
ed  and  sedulously-cultivated  influenr^;  over  the  In- 
dian tribes,  in  the  command  of  ilie  forces  of  the 
Fludaon  Bay  Company  which  are  at  hand,  and  in 
the  facility  with  which  she  could  transport   troops 
from  her  various  stations  on  the  Par itic.     Hut  if  we 
wait  a  few  yeai!<,  the  balance  of  (Mjwer  muse  change. 
Ciir.umstanccs  will  cast  it  on  our  side  ua  they  now 
do  on  hei-s;  and  in  n  contest — if  contest  there  must 
be  for  Oregon — we  shall  be  founil  the  stronger  party 
in  that  territory.     But  it  has  been  said  that,  if  we 
ri"fu.«io  to  give  this  iioiii'e,  we  Nliall   violate  (Uir  na- 
tional honor.     How?     Has  our  Hensibility  on  thi.'< 
jioiiit  been  just  now  awakened  ?     I'^rom  1818  i.i  this 
day  we  have  never  felt  this  Joint  oeeupalioii  to  l)e  a 
Htain  upon  our   national    honor,     bias  it   ever  been 
;  pretended  until  recently  that  it  was  a  disgrace  to 
:  continue  the  convention  <    In  there  anything  dishon- 
,  orable  in  adjourning  r  dispute,  without  tlicTeant  sur- 
i-ender  of  our  rights,  and  upon  terms  which  give  uh 
every  clvnce  of  acquiring  peaceably  all   that  wc 
;  claim  ?    The  other  party,  with  her  eycN  open,  has 
insisted  upon  placini;  the  determination  of  the  coii- 
j  troversy  upon  tliis  issue,  in  which  (he  advantages  are 
all  on  one  side.     Ik  it  not  a  wiser  as  well  as  a  more 
I  moderate  mode  of  disposfing  of  the  matter  to  abide 
j  by  these  terms  ?    Let   things  remain,  then,  ns  they 
are,  and  let  us  ]ia«s  such  measures  ua  may  encour- 
I  age  our  settlements  in  the  disputed  territory  without 
i  wMitravening  any  treaty  stipulations.    Thousands, 
or  even  hundreds  of  thousands,  expended  in  judi- 
cious measures  for  colonization  would  do  far  more 
for  our  ultimate  posiiossion  of  the  territory,  and  be 
fur  better  appropriated  than  millions  lavished  on  the 
uncertainties  of  an  unnecessary  war.    I  put  it,  lir, 
to  considerate  western   men — to  those  who  desire 
Oregon  more  than  war — if  such  a  course  of  policy  be 
not  the  wisest  which  we  can  pursue  with  reference 
even  to  the  single  end  of  acquiring  the  territory  which 
they  so  much  desire.     I  know  that  the  gentleman 
from  Indiana,  [Mr.  Owen,]  has  aoid  that  the  Hud- 
son Bay  Company  would  interpose  obstacles  to  our 
settlement  north  of  the  Columbia  river,  by  buy!  'g 
out  those  of  our  citizens  who  attempted  to  plant 
themselves  on  that  side.    He  has  mentioned  one 
case  in  which  he  has  known  that  to  be  done.    Poa- 
sibly  there  may  have  been  more;  but  is  not  that  dis- 
tinguished gentleman  too  well  aware  of  the  great 
laws  of  trade  to  suppose  that  they  would  long  keep 
up  that  game'  Besides,  this  is  a  gome  at  which  more 
than  one  might  play.     Docs  he,  or  any  other  man, 
l)elievc  that  if  our  settlements  are  once  nrmly  planted 
south  of  the  Columbia  the  crack  of  our  Ameridan 
rifles,  ond  the  sound  of  the  axe  of  our  western  pio- 
neer will  not,  in  due  time,  be  heard  not  only  north 
of  that  river,  but  north  of  the  4'Jth  parallel? 

But  it  is  said  that  England  will  notallow  this, and 
that  if  this  course  of  policy  be  attempted,  abe  will 
ere  long  give  notice  herself,  and  declare  war  up- 
on ua.  Let  her  if  she  chooses;  let  her  if  she  dares. 
She  then  would  become  the  aggresaor,  and  in  auch 
a  war  we  should  be  sustained  not  only  by  our  own 
conviction  of  right,  but  by  the  general  sympothiea 
of  mankind.  It  would  unite  our  people  instantly 
and  eifectually;  and  with  one  heart  and  with  one 
mind,  they  would  rally  to  the  reacue  of  nottonal 
rights  ana  national  honor  with  all  the  advanlofeaof 
previous  preparation,  and  with  the  spirit  which  haa 
heretofore  diatinguiabcd  them.    But  a  it  probable 


that  ihe  would  do  thitf  !■  the  in  a  poaition  to  do 
il  with  her  own  expreiMed  vicwa  of  ine  gn>\ind»  of 
her  titir?  She  claimi  a  right  to  joint  occupiitioii  in 
Or^nnii  under  the  convrniion  made  in  1818,  'ind  in- 
definitely continued  in  1897.  Whilst  thin  conven- 
tion eonliniie«<,  she  onjnye  the  joint  o''cupanr.y  l>y  a 
title  to  which  we  assent.  Suppose  she  were  tu 
put  an  end  to  this  convention,  slu  wouM  hut  reven 
to  her  title  under  that  of  Nootka  Hound,  by  whicli 
■he  herself  claims  only  a  right  of  joint  ocr.upancy, 
and  under  which  \\<:r  own  conmiiasiuncni  Imve  dis- 
claimed a  liilo  to  cxclu«ivo  sovereignty  in  iiiiy  por- 
tion of  the  territory.  If  the  were  to  give  ilie  iiulicc 
to  tcrminaio  our  convention,  under  thcwe  circiim- 
stances  she  would  situid  in  the  latitude  of  ulmndon- 
ing  a  riglil  whir.h  she  liild  liy  n  titlu  to  whicii  we 
'assented,  to  clmm  it  ap.-iin  by  another  which  we  re- 
fused to  acknowledge.  She  would  thus  place  ht-r- 
aelf  before  iho  wnrld  a«  eccking  war  for  wur'o  sake, 
and  aisurne  the  poNJtion  rirnii  unprovoked  und  wan- 
ton aggrcHSor.  In  thin  attitude  of  ufTuirH,  li'>w could 
■he  hold  up  her  head  in  the  I'ltcc  of  Chrltiiendoni,  or 
invoke  the  bleusings  of  the  Qod  of  battlcH  in  a  con- 
test which  she  had  so  insolently  and  wantonly  (tro- 
Toked?  ISut  could  nlie  have  any  adetpinte  mulive 
for  HO  wunlon  an  outrage?  She  can  liave  no  in- 
terest in  the  permanent  pnnsession  of  ihia  north- 
west coast.  Site  finds  fur  more  tlit^ililo  sites 
of  colonization  in  New  Holland,  New  /•^aland,  the 
Capo  of  Good  Hope,  and  in  the  Canadus.  These 
colonies  would  contribute  to  the  consolidation  und 
strength  of  her  empire.  They  lie,  too,  in  tiie  path- 
way of  her  commerce.  She  has  here  territory 
enough  to  absorb  all  her  immediate  and  proHpective 
means  of  colonization  for  a  century,  perhaps  for 
centuries  to  come.  It  may  be  important  to  her  to 
bold  there  for  a  time  certain  subordinate  right'<  of 
occupation  chort  of  the  sovereignty  of  Ihe  country 
in  Oregon.  But  of  what  use  can  it  he  to  her  tn  set- 
tle her  citizens  on  the  north  Pacific  coast?  It  in 
not  in  the  pathway  of  her  commerce,  although  it 
is  invaluabln  to  us  for  ours.  She  has  no  back  coun- 
try to  supply  through  the  little  strip  of  settlement 
wnich  sne  might  attempt  upon  the  coast;  but  we 
have,  and  itu  products  seek  an  outlet  by  our  com- 
merce on  the  western  ocean.  But  grant  that  she 
desires  it  ever  so  much;  must  she  not  know  per- 
fectly well  that  Ihe  thing  is  hopeless  r  She  may 
desire  it  as  the  means  of  keeping  us  out,  but  with 
what  proliability  of  success?  The  mighty  wave  of 
ourponulation  is  yearly  advancing  westward  at  the 
rate  of^  half  a  degree  of  longitude  on  a  line  of  more 
than  three  hundred  leagues.  Could  she  expect  her 
feeble  settlement!)  on  the  western  coast  to  resist  the 
vast,  increasing,  and  resistless  pressure,  when,  with 
Uie  mighty  weight  of  our  populationifrom  the  Atlan- 
tic to  tne  Bocky  mountains,  this  wave  shall  pour 
down  the  Pacific  slope?  Iler  statesmen  are  too 
wise  to  expect  it;  and  it  is  not  likely  that,  for  the 
■ake  of  the  little  ad  vantage  which  she  might  have  in 
that  quarter,  she  would  expose  herself  to  the  con- 
■tant  hazard  of  a  war  with  us.  Our  niutual  means 
of  annoyance  are  too  great;  our  mutual  interests  in  a 
TCciprocal  commerce  are  too  vast  for  her  to  be  wil- 
Udz  to  rial:  the  consequences  of  a  war  for  an  object 
.ao  patty  to  her,  however  important  it  might  be  to 

But  it  has  bean  aaid  by  aome^ntlemen  that  Great 

Britain  posasa^e^  am  great  facilities  for  colonization 

il  Oregon  ■■  we  do;  and  it  has  been  apprehended 

tiwt  the  might  give  this  new  direction  to  the  tide  of 

'-■tm  emigration.    I  here  no  ftan  upon  this  subject. 


I  reason  from  the  past  to  the  future.    If  she  has 
done  it  hrrciofore,  it  is  not  likely  that  she  will  d( 
hcre«iArr.    She  can   have  no  atronger  inducemi 
to  itnu  policy  fur  the  futiiie  than  she  has  aire 
had   in   the  past.     Emigrants  from  the  Old  W 
would  no  more  suit  Oregon  than  Oregon  would  i 
them.     It  is  only  by  a  people  trained  like  uur  we 
cm  pioneers,  that  this  territory  can  ever  be  redut 
tu  tlir:  permanent  use  and  occupotion  of  man. 
superiority  of  our  means  for  colonization  is  alrei 
evinced  by  the  difference  in  the  churacler  of  the 
ilenients  of  the  two  countries.     Our  people  do  not 


jcontroTff 
negotiali 
tain;  but  le 
1  now  so 
ietly,  iieuc< 
■what  we 
wnr  may 
H  in  thin  wi 
obtain  whu 
olo  of  Ore;; 
would  Ree 


der  which  i 
more.     Ii 


if  w< 


to  Orenon  to  hunt  and  fmh,  and  take  up  a  tem|>on  ^^^,^      ^  ^^^ 
abode    there.    They   go    to    settle    the  countrj  ^  ^^^j'^  ^^j. 
to     cultivate     and       improve     the     soil — and  '^ 
l<ave  nn  inheritance  to  llit-ir  posterity.     The  Bi 
mil  HPttlcmenlB,  on  Ihe  other  hand,  are  temjxir^  p„y„{fy. 
and  fusitivt      They  go  llifir  for  hunting  and  fur    J|„,j„»  ,i,^ 
diun  trade.     It  ih  no    p.irt   of  the   Brilioh    P"'"-yjth   " 
loloni//' Oregon,  and  It  novcr  will  be.    The  fact  I    („  ^^^    vi 
Mhr.  rentd  her  title  on  the  Nnotkn  Sound  convcntii  ^  j,         ' 
and  (Imins  noihing  more  than  tlic   risht  of  joint  i  Jj.jj '^y  ^ei 
(iipniicy  miller  il,  would  seem  to  indicate  ''""'  ,  gouih  in 
connidei8  it  nn  a  trriiporsry  stalioii,  and   looku  (  ,^  ^^  resist 
ward  to  its  uliimote  nimndonment.     If  this  coun  '^jj„y  „ci| 
IS  fit  for  agricultural  Bettlemenls,  and  our  peo  j^  me  mort 
should  seek    it  for  thav  purpose,  then  by  a  m  |{„o,„|cdire( 
"manifest  destiny"  it  must  oe  ours.  .  f^^^  ^^  "f^ 

Mr.  C.  .T.  Inokssoll  speaking  across.     How,  ^^^  gladly  i 
they  should  set  up  for  themselvea>  ,  purauing  i 

The  honorable  chairman  has  asked  me  whell||^  |^^  ^f 
the  people  of  Oregon  will  set  up  an  independent  gi  ^.^  ^^  from 
ernment  for  themselves.  I  have  no  idea  that  tn  ^^^^  ^^  ^^^ 
will.  If  this  nation  shall  proceed  in  its  prcs  ^^^  under  < 
course,  gradually  occupying  and  taking  possess  ^  ^^^^  ^^^^^ 
of  the  entire  breadth  of  the  continent,  from  the  J  ^^  this  as  I 
lontic  to  Ihe  Pacific  coast,  we  ahaU  possess  a  co  j  ^^.^^^  ^i^, 
sive  strength,  from  our  social  organization,  and  ph  ,'  \v(,iigt 
ical  and  geographical  position,  which  must  bind  ui  Ji^^.g  1^]^^,, 
an  indi.ssoluble  union.  Instead  of  forming  separ  ivnd  str 
und  independent  communities,  our  population  wo  ^i^^^  ^Q  f, 
present  to  the  world  the  glorious  speclacle  of  a  ^j  ^^^  ^^^ 
public,  the  greatest  and  the  widest  thai  the  ea  ^^  which 
ever  saw,  with  interests  different,  but  not  host  |  \^  ^^^^ 
with  regions  distinct,  indeed,  but  not  in  oppociti  ^.j^.g^  f^^ 
each  ancillary  to  the  other,  and  all  contributing  |'||  ^^jj  ^^^^^ 
the  general  strength  and  proaperity.  ^^  certain 

IVfr.    G.  J.    iNOKRnoLL,    speaking  across.    1  1^1^  count 
how,  if  there  should  be  a  black  tariff?  ^^i^i  pfoi,g 

Mr.  H.  continued.  Let  this  state  of  things  01  j^j^  Choi 
come,  and  I  tell  the  gentleman  that  we  shall  hear  ^^  g'l^jj  qj 
more  about  the  "black  tariff."  Open  to  us  the  t  j^.  If  it  \ 
Pacific  market  in  addition  to  that  which  we  m  g^g  ^  ^^^0 
enjoy  on  the  Atlantic,  let  the  productions  of  I  ^  ought  tc 
country  take  their  natural  and  unrestricted  coui  ,  djspossee 
to  pour  thcmst>lves  into  both,  and  there  will  l>c  ,,^1  tong^ 
danger  of  hostile  rivalry,  of  separation,  or  of  a  n  f  ^orse  t'h 
republic  setting  up  for  itself.  The  ties  of  uni  ,i]jty  ^|,i, 
would  strengthen  with  every  hour— mutual  benel  f^^f  g^o* 
and  mutual  interests  would  link  us  indissolubly  (,t  purposi 
gether.  There  is  no  darger  of  disunion.  Our  gri  ,{ if,g  ^\^,-J 
est  present  danger  is  from  rushing  into  a  warbefi  :tremereg 
we  are  preparwd  for  it.  ^  giopcs  w 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  again  appeal  ta  all  candid  a  ^^  their  wl 
reflecting  men  from  the  West — to  those  who  go  1  —  gg,,  fr, 
Oregon,  and  the  whole  of  Oregon— to  those  w  f  Pacific 
might  desire  war  for  Oregon,  but  who  do  not  des  ^^h  of 
Oregon  for  war — I  appeal  to  these  men  to  say  if  t  ^he  sai 
course  of  policy  which  would  lead  to  such  a  eO  ,tii  j^  )^f. 
summation  as  I  have  desoiibed,  be  not  the  pro|  ^Q^^f^  ^^ 
line  to  be  pursued?  If  we  wonid  see  thia  prospi  ,j  proper 
realized  certainly,  though  fnrfaaUy,  we  rattst    mnj„tiin, 

»al,  andl 


ure.    If  she  hai 
y  that  ahe  will  di 
rnnger  inducem 
lan  ahe  haa  af 
from  the  Old 

Ora|(on  woukl  « 
ained  like  our  we 

nn  ever  be  redu< 
lation  uf  mai) 


controTf  r«7  remain  aa  it  is.    Let  ua  not  renew 

nefotiation;   make  no  more  oflera  to  Great 

itain;  hut  let  us  trust  to  the  proceaa  of  eulonisn- 

now   BO   rapidly  in    progress,  and   we    ahall 

ietly,  |i«aceably,  ar^  certainly  obtain  the  whole 

•wnui    we  claim.      '.    care    not    how    K'nriou" 

r  !  wnr  may  be,  it  wojld  be  belter  to  avoid  it;  for 


».,.,„•;»»  ;»  -i^J  1"  '"  ''i'"  w«y  aloni  that  wo  muy  reasonably  hope 
XrSof^iell'^-'L-'^^^^^^^^^^ 


lolo  of  Orf^on."    Let  thinie:«  remain  nn  llicy  ore 
e  impoHsible  that  Qreut  Britiiin 

ettle    the  countn  '"''''  ''"'  ""  ""''  '"  the  Joint  occupancy  ns  long  as 

.v..     .  ;i     -  „i    "  rc»iw  her  title  on  the  f^ooika  Sound  convention, 

the     soil — and     ,        u'i.i.i'-'  j        i 

osteritv      Tin'  U\         *'hi<-h  nhc  claims  joint  occupancy,  and  noth- 

mnd    are  temnori  >  •""'"*'•     '"  ***"  meantime,  let  lis  go  on  and   fill 

r  i,,..',.:,>.,  n.wi  f  ,    '  country,  let  us  puas  such  measures  an,  without 

I         h,,  11 ''"•'"?  "'«  "«="'y.  wo"'»l  contribute  to  that  end; 

uriiiHn   r<'ii<  y|j  i,„.„  ,f  ^g  should  fl-i  { it  necessary  ultimately  to 

we  can  choose  our  own  time  for  do- 


ne 


II  be.    The  fact  t  \^ 
H  HiMind  coMVcniii  ^  j.        ' 


How 


112  1   o    .1"'"  '  But  my  western  friends  seem  disposed  to  reproach 
and   lookd  f  '  *^*'"^'' '?  '^'''  '"a"*'',  as  if  it  were  ungrateful  in 


to  icdicale  that 

n»   '  ir'7v,i'.")^nnnl^'"  '"  ""^sisl  that  mode  of  obtaining  Oregon  which 

.18    nnd  our  MO   ""^''^  "'"t*"^'"  '"''«'»'■«* '«  '»>•  beM.^Nolhin-  could 

nose     then  bv  am  '"  "**  '""'*'  ^^""  '^^'^^  ""  '"'P"'"l"J"'     T'":  South 

y     m  liiiowlcdgcs  iu  obligations  to  our  western  friends; 

!  feel   it,  feel  it  deeply  and  strongly,  and  would 


urn. 

ig  ucroae.  ii^Wrfcgi  giajiy  requite  it.'  'This  I  believe'  we  may  do 
,  .c:V..i  ««  «,i,-.i  pursuing  such  u  course  of  policy  aa  presents  the 
UnindeMiidrniei  '7 '"'po  of  ot't«'ning  allOregon.  whiUt  it  would 
e  no  id^  that  ill  '^  ""  '^'^*""  ''**'  dangers  and  sacrifices  of  a  war  for 
ceed  in  ita  orca  "'^''  ^^  "'"*'  ""l'"'P8'*'-'li  ""'' '"'«  which  we  must 
il   tokinw  poBseMl'*^'^  under  circumslanceM  Icsh  propitious  thun  they 


But  whilst  1  advo- 


ceed 

ntinenl  from  the  !l  '  ^^^^ ''''*'/ ''^  ^'^  hereafter 
hall  nAu>B«  n  /■«!  '^  thls  ds  the  wisest  and  most  statesmonlike  poll- 
en «\i«n«r.rf  nk  > '  '^""^ '''"'  ">>'  western  friends  will  unilcrtitand 
^hrSlbinYi  ;•  ^^'.iUc  in  tliio  matter  1  pursue  the  path  which 
,1  nffn-mino.  ul.^..  '*^**  ^Mtix  undur  convictK.na  of  duly  quite  ns 
ourpofulalfoX  "^J't^Tn^  ."their  own,  1  hope  they  will  per- 
ils spectacle  of  a  ".""^  '°  follow  it  without  reproach,  so  long  as  I 
^uiJt  th«i  thP  M  *'  ""  '■'■p"'oaches  m  them  for  choosing  a  difierenl 

ent  but  no  host  "'*''  *^"^^  '  '■''f''"^''  "^  "^"'^'^  "•"'«  P«"'"'J'".  "«' 
)utnotin  ocpo,iui  ly 'o  the  great  interests  of  the  country,  but  to  our 
i  «ll  Lm.r.AK  •'""•cafor  the  ullimale  pos.iession  of  Oreijoii.  i 
1  allcontribuung  n  aid  them  in  such  measures  as  I  believe  would 
'  7'  I  oit  certainly  enable  us  to  obtain  possession  of  the 

tariff?  ^lo'o  country;  but  I  cannot  assist  in  those  which 

,,       -  ,.  .  ould  probobly  defeat  that  oliject. 

Ih  .1.  I.  iiT*"  ^'■-  Chairman,  I  um  not  one  of  those  who  have 
inat  we  snail  near   er  said  or  thought  that  Oregon  was  not  worth  n 

■n.fZi^.^'jl"^  "■     If't«-"e  n  barren   rock  in  the  ocean,  if  it 
mai  wnicn  we  ni  ^j^  ^  ^^^^^  jjle  ^^^■     ^f  geashore  sand,  the  coun- 
I  producliona  of  l  ^  ^,„ght  to  fight  for  it  sooner  than  suffer  itself  to 
TJfc^  -in*""    dispossessed   by  violence.    To  depress  the  na- 

»na  there  will  ne  „m|  tone,  to  degrade  the  national  spirit,  would  be 
luration,  or  of  a  ii  ^  worse  than  w.-r  itself.  I  feci  the  solemn  rcspon- 
.  ine  uea  of  unj  )i]ity  which  rests  upon  us  to  defeiid  by  war,  even, 
our— mutual  l)enei  f  war  should  bo  necessary  as  the  only  means  for 
K  us  indisaolubly  ^^  purpose,)  every  inch  of  American  soil,  through- 
aiaunion.  ^^^S^*  it  the  whole  length  of  our  posee.ssions,  from  the 
ing  mto  •  war  ocf<  u g^ie  regions  of  the  frozen  north  down  to  the  sun- 

the  burning  line,  through- 
from  the  rising  to  the  set- 
steep  Atlantic  stream"  to. the 
~     I.     ^  A  J'    *■-<—•<'     -o'v,.       But    whilst    we    admit    the 

ut  who  do  not  dea  ^^j,  ^f  (i^^^  sentiments,  let  us  remember, 
uliTto       k^  the   same   time,   that   war   is  never  justifiable 

lead  to  aueb  a  «  j^jj  ^  becomes  necessary;  and  before  that  can  be 
Id  "?*.  "••?"*!  lownwe  must  first  have  exhauated  all  honorable 
iia  see  taia  P"^  id  proper  meaaurea  to  preserve  our  righia  in  peace 
luaiiy,  we  raiiat  majntain,  air,  that  there  ore  auch  meana  at  ourdia- 
»&],  and  by  adopting  them  we  may  not  only  avoid 


the  dangers  of  wac,  but  probably  tha  chanoe  of  lo- 
sing Omcon. 

Mr.  ChHinnnn,  1  will  go  farther.  If  'rom  theaA> 
tion  of  this  House,  or  from  any  other  circumatancea, 
war  should  occur,  althou<;h  inere  may  be  noutlicrn 
men  who  lielievo  that  it  could  havelicen  avoided,  yet 
I  lake  this  ocrjtsion  to  say  to  the  West,  that  when 
it  becomes  cloaily  necessary  nnd  pn;senUi  the  only 
remaining  mode  of  obtaining  our  rights,  they  will 
find  the  South  standing;  by  the  country  ond  by  them 
with  heart  and  hand.  Yes,  when  ihat  hour  comes — 
and  (iod  grunt  that  there  may  never  be  n  necessity 
for  it — the  mnxim  of  the  gaflont  Drcatiir  will  find 
one  universal  ari'ei)iaiii)n  nmtiniL;«i  the  whole 
Amerirjin  people — "our  country,  right  or  wronj." 
Many  may  l>e  found  deeply  deploring,  in- 
deed, the  mismana{;ement,  or  the  necessity, 
which  has  ])luiigrd  the  country  into  war,  but 
they  will  not  pause  Ip  settle  the  question  of 
responsibility  until  they  nave  first  done  all  that  be- 
comes them  to  preserve  national  rights  and  honor.  I 
must,  however,  here  declare,  in  n  spirit  of  entire 
frankness,  that  if,  by  giving  this  notice,  we  should 
ultimately  either  lose  Oregon  or  be  led  into  nn  unne- 
ceMisury  war  to  obtain  it,  those  who  give  tliis  nr'.ieo 
will  be  held  responsible,  at  the  proper  time,  for  all 
its  eonwec^uences.  It  is  the  undoubted  duty  of  every 
section  ot  this  eonfcdeiucy,  North,  South,  East, and 
West,  to  defend  the  national  soil,  and  protect  the 
national  honor,  liut  we  ov/e  it  to  ourselves,  to  our 
posterity,  and  to  the  rieal  intercBts  of  humanity,  to 
exhaust  all  honorublo  means  of  peace  before  we 
plunge  the  nation  into  war.  Wo  to  the  people 
amongst  whom  war  becomes  a  familiar  and 
a  household  word,  and  wo  to  the  statesman 
who  ciiltivaies  a  npirit  of  violence  amongst 
those  whom  ho  intlucncci,  instead  of  cherish- 
ing a  dispofition  to  [.eoce.  In  this  connexion, 
JVIr.  Choirman,  1  must  be  permitted  to  express  the 
profound  regret  with  which  1  have  heard  some  of 
ihc  i-emarks  madu  in  this  debate.  There  nre  ele- 
ments enOiir;h  of  strife  abroad  in  the  .public  mind 
without  eniisiin'^  the  passions  further  in  ihe  work  of 
havoc  and  riiin.  It  was  with  the  deepest  regret  that 
1  heard  members  upon  this  Hoor  tiuinting  the  admin- 
istration, and  dftcl-ring  the  lielief  that  it  would 
"back  out,"  and  ihat  it  could  not  be  "kicked  inton, 
war."  Thetic  soundci  fell  on  my  ear  like  the  echoea 
of  something  of  which  I  had  heard  before,  and 
which  contriuuted  to  tlie  same  rcHult  upon  another 
occasion — a  result  for  which  a  necessity  then  ex- 
isted, however  unlortHnate  it  might  be  now. 

There  never  was,  there  never  con  be,  an  admin- 
istration elected  by  the  people  of  this  country, 
which  could  refuse  a  war,  if  national  rights  and 
honor  required  it.  None  but  a  timid  administra- 
tion can  be  "kicked  into  a  war"  by  domestic  oppo- 
nents. It  requires  far  more  courage  to  resist  a  war- 
cry  than  to  yield  to  it.  It  sometimes  requires 
more  moral  firmness  and  grealor  and  higher  qunlitiea 
of  mind  to  withstand  the  first  outburst  of  tne  war 
feeling,  and  ralmly  to  appeal  to  the  sober  second 
thought  '  of  a  reflecting  people  for  ultimate  in- 
structions, than  to  be  the  hero  of  a  hundred 
fields. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  will  now  say,  and  I  desire  my 
words  to  be  noted,  that  if  any  gentleman  here  b^ 
licves  that  this  notice  will  lead  to  war,  and  yet  votea 
for  it  under  the  hope  that  the  President  will  back 
nut  aooner  than  face  the  result,  he  ia  utterly  mista- 
ken. Thia  administration  will  not  back  out  from 
any  poaitioa  which  it  hai  taken  iu  the  face  of  th« 


8 


world,  and  before  the  American  pfople.  Wltocv- 
er,  therefore,  votea  for  thia  meaaurej  roreaaciaif  ,.l>ut 
not  deairing  ila  eoneequencea,  will  be  (ar  e  re» 
ponaible  for  ihereault,  in  a  moral  point  of  view,  than 
(he  adminiatration  which  haa  acted,  >aa  I  believe, 
from  at.  honeat  though  erronaoua  conviction  of 
duty. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  will  conclude  by  obaervin((, 
that  I  am  fully  uwarc  tliat  nulhini;  which  I  rait  aoy 
w.ll  influence  the  action  ufthia  Houae.  I  never  ex> 
pected  that  it  would.  But  1  have  preMnied  my 
viewR  upon  tliia  subject  fully  and  frankly,  in  order 
that  1  muy  p!iu:e  myself  fuirly  before  my  conetitu- 
enta  and  rrienda,  who  alone  feel  en  inlereat  in  .nv 
courac.  My  anie  aim  haa  been  to  vmdicaUs  myself 
witli  them.  Would  to  God  that  1  had  the  power  to 
reach  the  heart  of  the  Ilnuao  and  the  nation! 
Would  to  Qod  that  i  coulo  persuade  them  to  be- 
ware, ere  they  precipitated  ihornseives  into  a  war, 
and  exposed  themselves  to  consequences  which  no 
eye  but  ihat  above  can  measure  or  pursue.  1  would 
beseech  rriy  countrymen  first  to  exhaust  all  the 
mean'i  of  prevrvii.^  peace  with  honor.    They  owe 


thia  to  themselves  and  their  poeteritr,  to  the  efcar< 
actor  of  the  country,  to  the  hopea  of  our  race,  and 
the  freat  intereaia  of  hunumitv.  Iftheae  rasa«uea 
should  Aut,  and  war  should  SecooM  inevitable,  wa 
should  CO  into  it  a  united  people,  with  one  heart 
and  with  one  mind.  Wo  should  g;o  into  it  with 
those  high  feelings  with  which  conscious  rectitude, 
and  an  outraged  apirit  can  alone  inspire  a  man  or  o 
people.  We  should  carry  with  us  the  sympothiea 
of  Christendoni;  and,  more  than  all.  we  might  de« 
voully  invoke  the  bleMung  of  theOod  of  battles  in  a 
contest  which  we  had  alone  nothing  to  provoke, 
and  we  had  sought  by  all  honorable  means  to  avert 
If  war  should  become  the  only  remedy  for  wound- 
ed honor  and  violnted  right,ail  will  rally  to  the  re« 
cue  of  the  country,  and  to  avenge  iu  wrongs.  Ai. 
devoted  its  any  in  the  gloriouM  band,  I  will  venture 
to  say,  the  sons  of  the  South  will  be  found  at  the 
post  of  duty — not  standing  byj  as  cold-hearted 
spectators,  or  us  laggards  in  the  day  of  trial.  No, 
sir;  they  will  be  found 

True  to  the  biat  o(  tliclr  Mo«(l  anil  their  breath. 

An4  Ulu!  tctt^n  iJc«c«ad  ta  th«  harvest  of  <l«iith. 


rilT,  to  Uic  eWx 
of  atir  nc*,  Md 
IfUMM  nuaanni 
HM  ineTttable.  wa 
I,  with  ona  mMt 
d  g|o  into  it  with 
naciou*  rectitude, 
lipira  a  man  or  a 
M  th«  Hynipathiei 
nil.  wn  micht  de 
iod  ofbatileaina 
thing  to  provoke, 
tie  mean*  to  arert. 
>medv  for  wound 
II  rally  to  the  re«< 
B  iu  wrong*.  As 
ind,  I  will  venture 
11  be  found  at  ih« 
yjai  cold-hearted 
giy  of  trial.     No, 

their  breath, 
iryeft  of  ilnith. 


I 


